Translation

Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Yaśovijaya's

JAINA-TARKA-BHĀṢĀ

OR

A Manual of Jaina Logic

1. On the Organ of Knowledge :

After bowing to Jina, who is saluted by the groups of Indras, and who gives instructions in the real nature of things, I compose the Manual of Logic, that consists of (three parts viz.) the organ of knowledge, the partial truth, and the different ways of putting a thing.

[1. The investigation into the definition of the pramāṇa in general].

*1. Pramāṇa is the definitive cognition of the self and the others.

Here *'self'* is the very nature of the knowledge itself, the *'others'* are objects other than that, and *'the definitive'* is that, which ascertains both of them as they are.

Here the word *'cognition'* is used to avoid undesirable extension to indeterminate intuition. The word *'definitive'* is used to avoid that (undesirable extension) to doubt, error and indecision. The epithet *'self and the others'* has been used to indicate the nature (of the pramāṇa) and by way of refutation of the Mīmāṁsakas etc. who hold the non-perceptibility of knowledge and of those who believe in the non-dualistic existence of knowledge etc. and deny the existence of external objects.

Now, if right cognition (itself) is meant to be pramāṇa, then what else is to be said as its resultant ? Correct; but its resultant is the definite cognition of the self and objects.

Now, in this way, the quality of being definitive cognition of the self and others, will not exist in the pramāṇa; the pramāṇa being definitive cognition of others and the resultant being definitive cognition of the self; if one argues like this, the answer is : no, because it will be rationalised by partial identity of (the two) the pramāṇa and its resultant.

Thus, it is concluded that the function-sense only, when engaged in its conscious activity, is the pramāṇa, because the self, unappropriated by its conscious activity, does not reveal its objects like touch etc., because (otherwise) a man in deep sleep would also have that (cognition) by the sense-object-contact with soft cotton etc.

⋆2. Some say that the sense *qua* attainment, characterised by the capacity of apprehending the objects is the pramāṇa, as **"the capacity of the self, in the form of apprehension of the object, is mentioned as the instrument and this is not relatively contradictory".** (TSV., 1.1.22) this is not correct, because the resultant of sense *qua* attainment is mediated by the instrument which is conscious activity, and because if by accepting the non-perceptibility of the capacities, the non-perceptibility and perceptibility of the knowledge of the instrument and the resultant (respectively) is accepted, it will amount to acceding to the view point of Prabhākara. If one argues that even the capacity of knowledge is perceptible, through the substance, in its substratum, which it pervades, i.e. the self, it cannot be so; if it were perceptible through the substance, it will not be in order to hold it as self-illuminating as is the case with happiness etc.; moreover the mention of instrument in (the sentence) 'I know the pitcher through knowledge' would be illogical; (for example) there is no mention of the neck and earthen bowl at the time of the perception of the pitcher, even though they are perceptible through the substance.

[2. Having defiined perceptual cognition, its division into two, empirical and transcendental:]

*3 That cognition is of two kinds: perceptual and non-perceptual. Perceptual is that which as an effect depends on the senses or the self which is called 'akṣa', a stock-word in

the category of Uṇādi words, in the sense of 'permeating i. e. pervading all objects in the form of knowledge.'

Not that in this way the title of 'perceptual' will not apply to visual intuition (of limited extension) and clairvoyance etc. and sensuous knowledge etc, because this is only its etymological meaning; its usage being in the sense of clarity, implied by it as one united word giving a single meaning. And 'clarity' means, revealing in a greater degree than that revealed by inference etc. ; (thus)there is nothing wanting here.

That which is hidden from sense is non-perceptual i. e. indistinct cognition.

*4. The perceptual cognition is of two types : the empirical and the transcendental. The empirical (sāṁvyavahārika) is based on unhindered transaction (saṁvyavahāra), characterised by day-to-day talk of engagements and withdrawals, e. g. perceptual cognition of ourselves. As it takes effect through the activity of the self, mediated by sense and mind in reality, it is non-perceptual, because the fact of mediation is here the same as in the knowledge of the fire by smoke. Moreover, it is in reality non-perceptual, because here also boubt, error and indecision are possible as in non-existent, inconclusive, and contradictory inference-fallacy and like a correct inference it also admits of the possibility of certainty preceded by agreement (intimation) and memory.

[3. The investigation into empirical perceptual cognition, and the distinction between sensuous and scriptural knowledge.]

*5. This (empirical perceptual cognition) is of two kinds: sensuous and quasi-sensuous. The sensuous is effected by eyes etc. and the quasi-sensuous is born of mind. Though mind functions even in the sensuous cognition, yet as it is the extraordinary cause there, it is no fault (to call it sensuous).

Both of these are of two kinds : sensuous cognition and scriptural knowledge. Sensuous cognition is conditioned by a sense and the mind and is not based on word, whereas that which is based on word is scriptural knowledge.

By the term 'based on word' is meant the knowledge in the form of the inward repetition of a word like 'pitcher is pitcher', having established the connection between the word

and its import either from the instruction of others about the intimated object or from the scriptural books. If one should say that in this way only perception would be sensuous cognition and not speculation etc. etc. because they are accompanied by the mention of word and are therefore to be included in the scriptural knowledge; it is not correct; because though at the time of intimation, speculation etc. are based on word, yet they are not based on that at the time of transaction, because by virtue of the skill through practice, it is found that even without basing on word, a variety of speech is preceded by the chain of manifold thinking. Since in Aṅgas Upāṅgas etc. and in the perception of word etc. there is no basis of word, it is sensuous cognition, but inasmuch as there also the meaning is known on the basis of words, it is scriptural knowledge.

[4. Four divisions af sensuous cognition, viz. perception etc.]

*6. Sensuous knowledge is of four kinds : perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, and retention.

The lowest knowledge is perception. It is of two kinds : contact-awareness and object-awareness. Vyañjana is that which menifests the object; (in the first place) it is the physical sense-organ shaped like Kadamba flower etc. and characterised by the particular power of cognising the objects of sound etc., (secondly) the substance transformed into sense-data such as sound (-atoms) etc, and (thirdly) the relation of the two (mentioned just now). So it (vyañjanāvagraha) is a compound in which the middle word has been dropped i.e. contact of vyañjana with vyañjana. Then if one argues that this is ignorance because no knowledge is received at that time, like the contact of ear and sound in the case of a deaf; it is not so; it being the instrument of knowledge, is by transference of epithet, called knowledge, because at it's culmination is seen knowledge in the form of objectperception, or even at that time an indistinct knowledge can be inferred like the dream-knowledge etc. which can be inferred by particular type of gestures etc. (and) because it cannot be marked—like one spark of fire—on account of its subtleness.

[5. In support of the non-contactory nature of mind and sight, while demonstrating the four types of contact-awareness.]

*7. That (contact-awareness) is of four kinds in accordance with the difference of senses except sight and mind, which being of non-contactory nature cannot have any contact-awareness;or otherwise, if they were the subject of favour and injury of the object known, there should have been wetness and burning at the sight and thought of water and fire. If it is argued that favour and injury of the eye are found at the sight of the sun and the moon etc., it is not correct, because it is not found at the time of their first sight; and because when seen constantly the injury by the ray of the sun, which comes into contact can be accounted for, as also the sense of favour because of lack of injury at the sight of the moon etc. which are possessed of natural qualities of gentleness etc.

At the thought of the dead or lost things, and the thought of the union of the loved ones and procurement of riches, the injury and favour, indicated by weakness and emaciation of chest etc. and by the beaming face and horripilation etc., do not belong to the mind; but to the self through the help of mind-*qua*-substance in the form of multitude of desirable or undesirable material atoms transformed into mental form; just like through the checking of wind in the heart and medicine; the contactory nature of mind is not proved by them. If it is said that if the mind does not contact its object by approaching it, how does the feeling that 'my mind has gone to Meru mountain etc.' come to a sleeping man; it is not true; because the dream of going of mind to Meru mountain etc. is false like that of the body, or otherwise there would be (undesirable) situation of the occurrence of favour and injury caused by the fragrance of flower etc. and the fatigue caused by travel etc.

If it is said that favour and injury by the sight of the bathing of Jina, experienced in dream and by non-attainment of the desired object (respectively) are seen with reference to the awakened person also, we answer that they may be seen because of the science of dream, but the result of the action, viz, satisfaction etc., is not there by the science of dream as to prove the contactory nature of mind in the form of contacting the object.

If it is said that the result of action in the form of discharge of semen virile is found in dream also; that is due to intensity of desire, and not due to the action of inter-course with the women, so where is the fault ? If it is said that listening to song etc. in cases of somnambulism, there is contact-awareness of the mind also, it is not so, for in that stage though one thinks oneself to be dreaming, yet one perceives through ears etc. alone. Because, on the authority of the statement like 'one who is negligent, does not know' because all being involved in the world have their activity of consciousness spread over infinite time-points, and because at every time-point, it receives mind-substance, even though not contacting the object, how the mind without leaving the body, will not have contact-awareness at the time of thinking about heart etc. which are in its vicinity; listen; mind is cogniser and not cognitum; contact-awareness is there at the time of cognising the cognitum and it has no scope, therefore, at the time of receiving matter constituting mind, nor has it any scope at the time of thinking about heart etc. which are in its vicinity, because the distinction of working in close contact or otherwise (not working in close contact) is decided from the point of view of external objects, or also because of the skilled cessation and subsidence of karmic veils of mind, there is no cognition of the object, and because even at the time of functioning of the senses of ear etc., the funcioning of mind is accepted only after the contact-awareness, because the meaning of the word mind (manas) 'thinks over(manyate)the objects', or 'by it are thought over(manyante) the objects,' conforms to its etymology, and because just as the language cannot function without indicating the meaning, similarly mind cannot function without thinking over the object. Thus it is concluded that eyes and mind have no contact-awareness.

[6. Treatment of object-perception.]

*8. Object awareness is the cognition of the general features without any distinction of form, name, genus, activity, quality, and substance. How then the scriptures say as 'he has cognised word', there is the non-existence of the absence of the

mention of 'word' etc.; no; because only the speaker says 'word', or because it is meant for not distinguishing it from the form and taste etc. If the determinate knowledge that 'this is word', were there in object perception, then since the word 'word' takes a period of less than forty-eight minutes (but more than one time point) to pronounce, the one time-pointedness of object-perception would be shattered. One may say : the cognition of both—the general and the special—may be included in object-perception, and later on may be considered the beginning of speculation in the form that 'here are, generally speaking, sweetness etc. the qualities of the sound of bow-string;' it is not so; because if it is cognition of the special as distinguished from non-word, it would be perceptual judgement, because the cognition of the little cannot be firmly established from the point of view of the further and further species. Moreover, the knowledge 'this is word' is not logically justifiable without the speculation in the form of thinking of word, as distinguished from form etc. and speculation is not possible in uncognised object, and, therefore, its place would have to be accepted before the time of object-perception accepted by us, and that (time) is the time of contact-awareness, devoid of the knowledge of object, and so on and so forth. Afterwards–because the speculation regarding the qualities other than that of sound is mentioned as 'which word is this,' the object-perception should be accepted in this form alone that 'this is word,' if it be argued; no; the word' is said by the speaker only, at the time of object-perception, the scriptures mention only indeterminate learning of word, and because the indeterminate is general in form, and the formless conscious activity can cognise that much only. And if the cognition of indeterminate word is accepted in contact-awareness, it would also become object-perception, because it cognises the object.

*9. Some say: from the point of view of a child who is just born and is devoid of the ideas of intimation etc., cognition is that of general nature, but for a man who is conversant with the object, the cognition is special, and therefore from this point of view it is not logically incoherent to

say that 'he cognises the'word', it is not so; in this way for more intimately conversant, it would be, beyond the determinate knowledge of word, a cognition of many-many specials. And we cannot say that 'this is desirable,' the scripture does not speak of any adjective (but says unqualifyingly) that 'one does not know which word is this,' even the wisest cannot cognise the further and further qualities without cognising the word, which is qualified.

*10. Others say that the scriptural statement is consistent because object-perception is said to be preceded by intuitional cognition, and intuitional cognition, cognises indistinct general features, whereas the object-perception cognises the form of the object as distinct from other objects; this is incorrect; Does the intuitional cognition precede contact-awareness, or is it identical with it ? The first alternative is not possible, because it (intuitional cognition) is not possible without the relationship of the object and its awareness. Nor is the second alternative possible, because at the last moment of the contact-awareness, object-perception takes place and there is no place for intuitional cognition. Nor is the third alternative possible, because then it (intuitional cognition) would be just another name for contact-awareness, and because it is devoid of object -cognition, intuitional cognition is not possible in it. Moreover, how can intuitional cognition, without speculation, lead to object-perception ? And how can speculation and perception, which last separately for innumerable time-points (and one time-point) occur simultaneously ? This should be thought over. If it be said that since even perception has been shown as having the varieties of quick and otherwise (slow) etc. it also lasts for innumerate time-points and is not incoherent with having the particulars as its object; it is not so; in reality, these are the varieties of perceptual judgement, and have been described as varieties of perception on the basis of secondary usage of the effect in the cause, because the particulars cannot be the subject in reality in such cases where particulars are not the subjects.

*11. Or perception is classified into two : The transcendental and empirical. The former cognises only the gene-

ral features, the latter has the particulars as its subject;because the speculation occurs in the form of curiosity regarding the further and further qualities over and above that; otherwise as it would lead to the non-occurrence of speculation without perception, it is here alone that the varieties of quick and otherwise (i. e. slow) can be justified, and it is because of this that the practice of the chain of further and further knowledge should be understood.

[7. Investigation of speculation, perceptual judgement and retention, respectively.]

*12. Speculation is inquisitive pursuit(for the knowledge) of specific details, i. e. it removes the points of disagreement and applies the points of agreement, e. g. 'this must be normally sound as being capable of reception through ears etc.' or 'this must be the sound of a conch as it is possessed of the qualities of sweetness etc.' This is not doubt, because that consists in knowledge of various objects of opposite nature in the same subject, and because this, being inclined towards definiteness, is different.

*13. Perceptual judgement is the determination of the specific characteristic of that which was speculated upon. e.g. 'This must be sound only,' or 'this must be the sound of conch only.'

*14. That(perceptual judgement)being firm-fixed is retention. It is classified into three: absence of lapse, memory and memory-impression. Absence of lapse is absence of removal of uninterrupted conscious activity on one object. Memory is the unfoldment of that very conscious activity on the object after an interval as 'it is the same.' Memory-impression is the impression which causes memory and is carried by perceptual judgement. Since both types of perceptions are included in perception and three types of retention in retention, the division (of sensuous cognition into four) is not disturbed.

*15. Others, who follow only the etymological meaning viz. that perceptual judgement (apāya) is removal (apanayana) and retention (dharaṇa) is retaining (dhāraṇā), say that 'perceptual judgement is the determination of distinction from the non-existent particular and retention is

the determination of the existent particular' ; this is not so, because perceptual judgement sometimes coming from thinking of the distinction from others, sometimes from agreement with existing qualities and sometimes from both, has no varieties, being only of one variety, which is certainty; otherwise memory (which being incapable of being included in 'retention', in the sense taken just now) would be excessive and there would be the incoherency of sensuous cognition having five varieties. Now, if it be said, that the retention, accepted by you, does not exist at all, and, therefore, the fourfold division is undisturbed; because on the cessation of conscious activity, what is retention ? Absence of lapse, defined as the uninterrupted conscious activity, does not differ from perceptual judgement. And what is accepted as memory-impression for numerable or innumerable time at the conclusion of the conscious activity regarding pitcher etc., and the memory in the form of 'it is the same', it (both of them) is not retention, which is a variety of sensuous cognition, because the conscious activity of sensuous cognition has already ceased, and even in the case of conscious activity occurring after an interval of time, memory would be included in retention, where agreement with the existing qualities would predominate; it is not so; as after the working of perceptual judgement is seen, the working of its current for a moment, therefore, absence of lapse (will have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement), and as joining the indeterminate intuition of the present and the past as 'this is the same', and the resultant of the previous perceptual judgement, memory (will also have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement) and also the memory-impression in the form of impressions causing that (memory) (will have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement).

*16. If it be said that the two forms of knowledge, the absence of lapse and the memory, as cogniser of the already cognised, are not organ of knowledge; and as for memory-impression, these are the three options : is it destruction-cum subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karman of memory, or is it the power to generate that knowledge or is it a thought about that object ? Now, the first two options are

incompatible, because they are not (included) in the form of knowledge, the varieties of which are under discussion here. The third option is also incompatible because memory-impression is desired to last for numerable or innumerable time, but thought about an object cannot last for this much time, and, therefore, no retention is compatible; it is not so; being the cause of memory-impressions of different natures of clear, clearer and clearest type, and because of its being cogniser of newer and newer objects, absence of lapse (is the cogniser of the uncognised) and so also, being the cogniser of previously uncognised oneness of the object, memory is the cogniser of the uncognised, and by transference of epithet of the effect to the cause, though itself the memory-impression is not knowledge; yet its categorisation as the variety of knowledge is not incompatible, because it is the power which generates that knowledge in the form of destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karman of memory.

*17. And these determinate perception etc., do not occur either in a perverted or disturbed order, or deficiently, because it is the nature of the cognised to generate cognition in this very way. Sometimes, in case of a man who is habituated to it, only perceptual judgement, and in case of an object where the memory-impression is strong, only memory is noticeable; even there the order of determinate perception etc. is not noticeable on account of subtlety like the piercing of the hundred petals of a lotus. Thus sensuous knowledge has twenty-eight varieties; object-perception etc. (by etc. we include speculation, perceptual judgement and retention) being multiplied by six—mind and (five) senses, (thus twenty four) plus contact-awarenss having four varieties (there being no contact-awareness of mind and eyes). Or these varieties multiplied by the twelve varieties—many, multiplied, quick, independent, determined, and constant (these six) and their opposites—work out to be three hundred and thirty six in all. These varieties many etc., are from the point of view of cognizant; e. g.—some one knows much, listening to the

group of different sounds, knows that there are 'so many sounds of conch and so many sounds of drums' i. e. in this way, he distinguishes separately between the different types, on account of the speciality of destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans. The other, on account of lesser destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans, even though in the same place, knows less. One, on account of the brilliance of the destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans, knows multi-typed, knowing even the single sound of conch etc. as possessed of many qualities of agreeableness etc. The other knows non-multi-typed, knowing as possessed of few qualities of agreeableness etc. One knows quickly, cognising immediately. The other knows slowly, cognising only after a long thought. One knows independently, cognising by its very form without any sign. The other knows dependently cognising only by the help of some sign. Sometimes it is determinate, being cognised as not possessed of contradictory qualities. The other is indeterminate, being cognised as possessed of contradictory qualities. One is constant, being cognised always as much etc., the other is inconstant, being cognised sometimes as much, sometimes not as much. The varieties of sensuous knowledge have been said.

[8. Investigation of verbal knowledge after classifying it into fourteen varieties].

*18. The varieties of verbal knowledge are given. Verbal knowledge is of fourteen types: alphabet, discursive, right, having beginning, having end, containing repetitions, and included in the main scripture (these) together with their opposites. Then the alphabet is three-fold: script, alphabet, and potential auditory attainment. The script alphabets are the different types of scripts, the alphabets are the spoken akāra etc.— these two are called knowledge only by transference of epithet. The potential auditory attainment is the conscious activity towards listening through mind and senses or the destruction-cum-subsidence of the veil of that (verbal knowledge). This potential auditory attainment is not impossible even without receiving instruction from others, because attention is seen at hearing of a sound even amongst innocent children, who have received no instructions, and amongst

cows etc. and because even the one-sensed creatures receive indistinct sounds. A non-alphabetical verbal knowledge is sighs etc. because it also causes real functioning knowledge because from it also arises the knowledge that one is in misery etc. Or being useful in knowledge, though all the activities are verbal knowledge, yet here (in sighs etc.) alone is fixed the conventional usage, as famous amongst those who are well versed in scriptures. The knowledge of those possessed of mind is discursive. The opposite of it is non-discursive. What is included in the main and subsidiary scriptures, is right; the mundane is false. Thinking from the point of view of the knower, there is option—even the false knowledge acquired by a person of right vision is right knowledge, because of its suitable adjustment as an incorrect statement, whereas even the right knowledge, acquired by a man of perverted vision, is wrong knowledge. Having a beginning— (it has a beginning) substantially with reference to an individual, territorially, in Bharata and Airāvata, periodically, the ascending and descending rounds (of the circle of time),and psychically, the efforts etc. of those instructors. Having no beginning—(it has no beginning) substantially with reference to different individuals, territorially in Mahāvideha, periodically quasi - ascending and descending rounds (of the circle of Time) and psychically, destruction-cum-subsidence in general. Similarly, the varieties having end and having no end should be thought of. Repetitive is the same reading, generally in the dṛṣṭivāda(the twelfth and the last, and now supposed to be lost, limb (aṅga) of the scripture). Non-repetitive is the unsimilar reading in the Kālikaśruta (a Jaina scripture). That is said to be included in the main scriptures, which is composed by the gaṇadharas (direct disciples of the Tīrthaṅkaras). That is said to be excluded from the main scriptures which is composed by the elders (of the monastaries). In this way, the empirical perception in the form of sensuous and verbal cognition together with their varieties, has been investigated into.

[9. After classifying the transcendental perception into three, the investigation of clairvoyance at the outset].

*19. That which for its genesis depends only on the activity of the soul is transcendental (perception). It is threefold: clairvoyance, telepathy and perfect knowledge. Having all those objects which have forms as its subject and depending only on the Self is the clairvoyance type of knowledge. It is six-fold:following, augmenting, and extinguishing together with their opposites. Following is that which follows even to the place other than that of its genesis,like the light of the sun;just as the light of the sun arising in the east spreads to the west also and, illuminates the territory there, similarly this also though generated in one place, illuminates the objects to the man even when he moves. Non-following is that which illuminates the objects only in the place of its genesis, like the knowledge of an astrologer (who answers questions); just as an astrologer answers the question asked only at certain places, similarly it also illuminates objects only at authorised places. Gradually increasing from the place of its genesis is the augmenting, like the fire, placed in the multitude of dry and increasing fuel and enkindled by the burning of the lower and upper pieces of wood of *Premna Spinosa;* just as fire enkindled by effort, increases at gaining of fuel, similarly by virtue of extremely auspicious actions, this also augments after genesis. Decreasing is that which gradually decreases in its scope after genesis, like the flame of fire on the removal of the mass of the fuel-matter; just as the flame of fire, with its fuel removed, decreases, this also decreases. Distinguishing is that which after its genesis, perishes absolutely like the wave of the water; just as the wave of water, just after its genesis, disappears completely similarly this also. Non-existinguishing is that which lasts upto death or upto the attainment of pure-knowledge, like the sex-consciousness; just as the male-sex-consciousness etc. lasts as long as the male form etc. of existence endures, similarly this also.

[10. Investigation into Telepathy]

*20. That which has a direct cognition of mind only is telepathy. Here it should be noted that it can directly cognise only the psychic modes and cognises the external objects only

through inference of the logical impossibility of the one in the absence of the other. It is two-fold : straight-intelligence and wide-intelligence. Straight i. e. cogniser of the general intelligence, is the straight-intelligence. Here '*general*' means lesser particulars than those (known) by wide-intelligence; otherwise, if we accept only cognition of the general (and no particulars), it would be the same as the indeterminate intuition of the psychic modes. Wide,—i. e. cogniser of the particulars, intelligence is the wide-intelligence. By straight-intelligence is known that one has thought about pitcher etc. whereas wide-intelligence cognises it, as possessed of hundreds of modes. Both of these cognitions are called partial perceptions as having partial objects as its subject.

[11. Investigation into Pure-knowledge]

*21. That which has a direct cognition of all substances with modes is called pure-knowledge. Therefore, it is called perfect perception. As its cause—the destruction of veil—is one; it has no variety. Here the veil is karman only, because our knowledge, which does not work in its sphere, is veiled (and) if all things cannot be its sphere, it would lead to the absence of the knowledge of necessary concomitance; and in the absence of veil, absence of lucidity would be incoherent. On the destruction of veil by right faith etc. which are opposite to karman, the pure knowledge is attained (or proved).

*22. Some say, 'it is born of mind only purified by the qualities by spiritual practices'; it is not so; even the mind, purified by qualities, cannot generate it like the knowledge of the objects of five senses.

*23. The Digambaras (a sect of Jainism) say that a person who takes morsels of food, cannot have pure knowledge; it is not so; because the taking of morsels of food, is caused by hunger creating karman, and the rise of unpleasant-feeling karmans etc. have no contradiction with pure-knowledge, because it has contradiction only with destructive karmans. If it be said that it is not generated from that (karman) which is like a burnt rope, it is not so; for in this way there would be no mundane existence from the similar age-determining karman.

Moreover, how can there be existence of gross-body of the Lord without the food of morsels ? If its possibility without that be accepted on account of infinite energy, it would lead to the absence of taking of food even in the worldly state, because of the conviction of immeasurable power (in that state also); this all has been explained elsewhere. Thus perception has been described.

[12. After defining and classifying non-perceptual into five, investigation of recollection].

*24. Now non-perceptual is described—non-perceptual is that which is not clear. And it is of five kinds : recollection, recognition, reasoning, inference, and verbal testimony. Recollection is the cognition generated only by experience as 'that is the image of the Tīrthaṅkara (Lord)'. This is not non-organ of knowledge, because of its coherency like perception etc. If it be said that it is non-organ of knowledge because it makes the part of the past indicated by 'that', as a subject of present; it is not so; because it is not a rule that the time of qualified be always felt in the qualification. If it be said that it is a non-organ of knowledge because of its dependence on the cognitive organ of experience; it is not so; because (in that case) even inference would not be organ of knowledge, on account of its dependence on the knowledge of necessary concomitance etc. If it be said that inference is dependent on the other only in its genesis, but it is independent in its cognition of the subject; it is not so; even recollection depends on experience in its genesis only, and as far as its cognition of the subject is concerned, it is also independent. If it be said that recollection, which knows only that which has already been a subject of experience, is not independent even in the cognition of the subject; then, as cognising the objects which have already been the subject of the knowledge of necessary concomitance etc., the inference also cannot be the cognitive organ in any case. If it be said that the inference invariably makes an uncognised object as its subject, then it is the same case with recollection which makes the object, hitherto unknown as 'this is that', as its subject.

[13· Investigation into recognition]

*25. Recognition is the synthetic knowledge, caused by experience and recollection, and cognising the similarity (between the two) and identity (of one person at different ages) etc., e.g. 'This body of the cow is the same,' 'gavaya (the Gayal) is like cow', 'he is the same Jinadatta', 'he is saying the same thing', 'a buffalo is different from the cow', 'this is away from that', 'this is near that', 'this is longer or shorter than that' etc.

*26. The Buddhists hold that there is no one knowledge as recognition because it consists of two varieties in the form of this and that which are obvious and obscure respectively; it is not correct: because it is experienced as one like the knowledge of the picture even though it differs in form, and because, in fact, this is one as being obscure in form and generated from its own source and because the indication 'this' is the cause of recognition. If it is said that this recognition does not exist because of the absence of its subject; we say : no; because it has as its subject the particular object which is one consisting of the former and the latter modes. Therefore, the view 'that this is, in fact, a couple of knowledge in the form of experience and memory not touching anything unperceived hitherto' is refuted; because in this way there would be the unacceptable position of the elimination of all qualifying knowledge. Yet some hold the view that this is perceptual cognition, because it conforms to the concomitance in agreement and disagreement with the senses; this is also not so; because the confirmation to the concomitance in agreement and disagreement with direct perception cannot be proved, because the confirmation to the direct perceptual cognition and memory (both) of the recognition is experienced, otherwise, there would be an undesirable occasion of its occurrence at the time of first sight of the object.

*27. And, if this be said that recognition is produced by senses with the help of the memory, produced by the awakening of the latent impressions, born at the time of first sight, at the time of the next sight; it is incorrect; because direct perception is not dependent on memory.

Otherwise, if we accept its mental cognition depending on the memory of concomitance etc., there would be an undesirable occasion for the elimination of the inferential knowledge of fire in the mountain. Moreover, it is an additional type of cognition because we have a different feeling of 'I recognise here,' this refutes the view that 'this is a qualified direct perception with the knowledge of its qualification at the approximity of the senses with the objects qualified'; because we don't have it in 'he is like this' etc. and because we experience a synthetic order in memory and experience.

*28. Here, the Bhaṭṭa school holds, "Let recognition be one knowledge, but the knowledge of similarity at the sight of gavaya and at the memory of cow is analogical. It is said :

"Therefore, whatever is remembered is qualified by similarity. Therefore, the similarity of the standard or the standard of similarity itself is its subject. Though the similarity is directly perceived and the cow is remembered yet the quality of being qualified cannot be proved from any other organ of knowledge and, therefore, analogy is an organ of knowledge;" (SV., up., 37-38)

this is not so; there is a synthesis between the body qualified by similarity and seen and between the cow which is remembered, and the synthetic knowledge that 'gavaya is similar to cow' does not overlap the limit of recognition. Otherwise, in such cases as 'the buffalo is dissimilar to cow' there would be an excess to analogy because this is not the subject of similarity and, therefore, there would be disturbance in the number of organs of knowledge.


*29. This refutes the view point of Naiyāyikas also who hold analogy to be cognition of the relationship of word and its meaning as this is to be indicated by the word gavaya caused by the knowledge of the meaning of the analogical sentence 'gavaya is like cow' and based on the act of looking at a body qualified by similarity, because it does not exceed the limits of the recognition being synthetic of the indicativeness of the word 'gavaya' in the object by saying that whatever qualities were

described in the analogical sentence are found in the indicativeness of that word. Therefore, those who have a knowledge of the meaning of the sentence that "swan is one which discriminates between the water and the milk" can have the knowledge that this is to be indicated by the word 'swan' at the sight of an individual qualified by discrimination between water and milk. If we were to accept an extra organ of knowledge except recognition for the knowledge that this is to be indicated by the word 'gavaya', then we would have to search for another organ of knowledge to know that 'this is subtler than that,' at the sight of a bigger fruit—bilva (Aegle Marmelos)—of a person who has the impression of the sight of a smaller fruit—āmalaka (Emblic Myrobalan). If these were to be accepted as mental(cognition) then there would be an occasion for accepting even analogy as mental. Therefore, in short, recognition should be accepted in the knowledge "I recognise".

[*14. Investigation into Reasoning*]

*30. Reasoning is the logic about the probandum and probane relationship etc. with reference to all places and types, for example, wherever there is smoke it is always when there is fire or it is not without fire; all words of 'pitcher' indicate pitcher; all pitchers are indicated by the word pitcher etc. Thus, the direct perception does not work—simply because it is not within its jurisdiction even with the help of the concomitance in agreement and disagreement together with repeated sight—in the concomitance, characterised by no exception, and caused by the innate nature of the object; and, certainly it can be known by summarising all the individual cases of the probandum andt he probane, therefore, only reasoning caused by the sight, memory and recognition of the probandum and the probane is capable of making it known.

*31. Now if this be said that since the concomitance characterised by co-existence in its own probandum is capable of that, therefore, by the senses helped by repeated sight and by non-observation of any exception, the concomitance may be said to be perceived because it is possible



to summarise all individual cases of the probandum and the probane by the relationship of generalisation; it is not so; because, all individual cases of the probandum and the probane are summarised by reasoning alone which is experienced as 'I reason', and because there is no proof to assume the relationship of generalisation in knowing the concomitance, and also because without logic even if the general is known, it cannot bring to mind all individuals. The relationship of the word and its meaning is also known through reasoning, because only it can cover all the words and their meanings. It is seen that a man, who comprehends the word, looking at the efforts of an elderly person, who is asked to do a thing and who proceeds to do it hearing another elderly person, who asks him to doi t, as the cause of the knowledge caused by it and remembering at the time of the last syllable, the previous syllables also and having recognition in the form of a synthetic knowledge in the form of words and sentences by process of elimination and addition by summarising all individual cases, gets the knowledge of the relationship of the word and its meaning. And as this reasoning does not depend on the relation of any other knowledge and by its own capability it leads to the knowledge of the relation, therefore, there is no case of regressus ad infinitum.

*32. The Buddhists say that this is not an organ of knowledge as being in the form of an after-thought coming after the direct perception; this is not so; even an after-thought coming after direct perception can know only that which is known by direct perception, and therefore, cannot grasp the concomitance by generalising all. And this is an organ of knowledge like an inference, even though its subject is general; just as you accept validity from practical point of view (of inference) which, though dealing with no object (i.e. general), is indirectly connected with an object. They hold the doctrine that in a place where there is neither fire nor smoke, a person has non-observation of smoke first, then having observation of fire and smoke, (thus) with one non-observation and with two observations, afterwards having non-observation of fire and then non-observation of smoke also, by these two non-obser-

vations, he grasps the concomitance by direct perception with the help of five non-observations ; for it is said:

(1) No knowledge of smoke, (2) knowledge of fire, (3) knowledge of smoke and (4) no knowledge of fire and (5) smoke, thus by direct perception and by non-observation by these five there is the adjustment (of the knowledge of the concomitance); this is wrong; even the two types of direct perception-observation and non-observation—can perceive an object which is at hand and cannot have any imagination (of the past or the future) and therefore, is not capable of observing all objects mediated by distance etc.

*33. As regards the view point of the Naiyāyikas who hold that reasoning is the reference to determinant concomitant when there is a doubt about determinate concomitant and this is like a particular observation only helpful in the organ of knowledge at the time of the opponents or is only just its concurrent as remover of the doubt of the opponent and is not in itself an organ of knowledge; this is not so; because reasoning is in itself an organ of knowledge in the form of grasping the concomitance and giving definitive knowledge of the self and others, and the logic, as assumed by the opponents also sometimes being a part of this thinking or as being the remover of the doubt of one who wants to conclude perversely or even independently, being a remover of the doubt in general, is used. In this way, the validity of reasoning asserted by Dharmabhūṣaṇa as remover of ignorance is justified inasmuch as it is the remover of false knowledge concluding in the definitive knowledge of the self, on which (definitive knowledge) depend the usage of the knowledge of the objects in knowledge; it is the resultant in general.

[*15. The definition of the inference for one self, after classifying inference into two*]

*34. Inference is the knowledge of probandum from probane. It is of two varieties : for oneself and for others. The inference for oneself is the probandum caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the probane, e.g. the knowledge, that 'the mountain contains fire', arising in a

person who has perceived the smoke and has (also) recollected the concomitance. Here the knowledge of the probane and the recollection of the relationship should be jointly accepted as the cause, otherwise there would be an occasion for occurence of inference with reference to a person who has forgotten or not grasped the relationship and has not perceived the probane.

[16. Discussion about the nature of the cause]

*35. The cause is characterised by the certainty of logical impossibility (of the one) in the absence of the other and not characterised by the three etc. The Buddhists, nevertheless, say that the cause has three characteristics. In the absence of subsistence in the subject the non-existent will not be eliminated and in the case of no subsistence in the homologous instance, there will be no removal of contradiction and there would be no possibility of the negation of inconclusive in the absence of the necessary absence in heterologous cases and, thus, the inference will not be without obstacles; it is not so; even in the absence of subsistence in the subject, the inference is seen in such cases as the 'śakaṭa will rise because kṛttikā has arisen', 'the sun is above because the earth is enlightened', 'there is moon in the sky because there is the moon in the water. It should not be said that here also subsistence in the subject can be established by saying that the time and space is possessed of the śakaṭa which would rise in the future, because it is possessed of the rise of the kṛttikā because if we were to accept subsistence in the subject, in this way, with reference to a subject which is not experienced, then with reference to the subject of the world, the blackness of the crow would be established as a means to the whiteness of the palace also.

*36. If the subsistence in the subject is not a part of the inference in this way, then how is the rule of the knowledge of the subject—if this be asked; sometimes the subject is known as an epithet of the logical impossibility in the absence of other e.g. the existence of the moon in water cannot be established without the existence of the moon in sky and sometimes, the subject is known as the substratum of the cause which is

grasped, e. g., the mountain has fire because it has smoke; if smoke is here grasped in the mountain, the fire is also felt there. At the time of grasping the concomitance, as there is not always the feeling of the mountain, it is not grasped.

*37. As for the view that association of the subject with the probandum is felt by grasping the relationship of the probandum and the probane of the subject in the internal concomitance as it is said that **"in the subject which is treated as thesis, the concomitance of the probane with the probandum is the internal concomitance, at other places it is external concomitance (Pra. Na. 3. 38)"**; it is not so; by the internal concomitance if the cause is capable of giving the knowledge of the probandum, the external concomitance would have to be accepted as a futile invention. The concomitance being defined as innate without any exception and the external concomitance being only an associate, the concomitance of universal nature can hardly be said to have any variety only on account of its subject. If it be not so, then only at the time of grasping an internal concomitance, there would be the experience of the relationship of the subject and the probandum and the inference would be futile without the knowledge, 'the mountain has fire', this should be thought upon by the scholars in accordance with the scriptures. In this way what the Naiyāyika holds as the thesis being hindered as in the inference that 'these mango fruits are ripe because they are grown on the same branch, like the other mango fruits', and where there is an inconclusive reason in such examples as 'this Devadatta is a fool, being his son, as are his other sons'; in order to avoid undesirable extension in such cases, the three characters given above together with the subject as unhindered and the reason as non-inconclusive, the five characteristics form the definition of cause; this is also refuted because the sustenance in the thesis cannot be established in such cases as 'śakaṭa will rise' etc. and because these five characteristics exist in cases of fallacies also as 'he is black, because he is his son'. So a definite logical impossibility in the absence of the other is always the proper characteristic of the cause.

[17. the discussion of the nature of the probandum].

*38. Certainly,the probandum is to be inferred by the cause. Now, if it is asked : what is the definition of the probandum, our answer is : a probandum is that which is neither known, nor refuted and is desirable. The epithet of 'neither known' is given to establish that those objects which are doubted or grasped contradictorily are probandum. The epithet 'nor refuted' has been given here to avoid the acceptance of that as probandum, which is contradictory to direct perception etc. The epithet of 'desirable' is given to prove that an undesirable thing cannot be a probandum.

*39. Some say that only a doubtful thing can be established as a probandum in a debate; it is not so; because even a man who is perverted or ignorant may also engage himself in a debate with a desire to know the views of the opponents and because it can be used to remove the perversion and the indecision just like the removal of doubt, and, because it is seen that father etc. engage themselves in educating the son etc. who are perverted or ignorant. It cannot be said that in such case, inference cannot be used in a debate which is held for victory, because the other person, being proud, is perverted in that case also.

*40 The epithet of'nor refuted'is given in connection with both the speaker and the opponent because only that which is not proved otherwise by an organ of knowledge can be a probandum in a debate. The epithet of being desirable is said only with reference to the speaker, because it is only the speaker who can possibly desire to support his own point of view. So, in inferences as 'eyes etc. are meant for others', even though only this much has been said that they are meant for others, yet only this can be established as probandum that they are meant for the self. Otherwise, because the Buddhists accept the eyes etc. to be meant for others, which are a collection, the inference being futile; this inference of the Sāṅkhya would be fallacious as possessed of incoherence etc. The subject which is useful in the inference for others is shown even at the time of the inference for the self, to show that there is not much difference between the two, because

the inference for others is always preceded by the inference for the self.

***41.** From the point of view of grasping the concomitance, the quality itself is the probandum, otherwise it cannot be established, whereas from the point of view of inference, the subject, together with its quality to be proved is the probandum. This subject is called the thesis also and this thesis is always well known. Thus, there are three parts of an inference meant for the self—the subject, the probandum and the probane. The probane is the part as indicator, the probandum as indicated and the subject as the substratum of the quality to be proved, because the purpose of the inference is to prove the probandum as residing in a particular substratum. Or the thesis and the cause—these are the two parts in the inference for the self, because the thesis is the object which is qualified by the quality to be proved and, thus, two alternatives can be seen with reference to the desire to express the difference and the identity of the quality and the qualified object.

***42.** The qualified object is sometimes proved, sometimes optional and sometimes both. That which is proved by a definite organ of knowledge as direct perception etc., is said to be the proved one. That which is the subject of such knowledge which is indefinite and neither valid nor invalid, is optional. That which is the subject of the both is the proved and the optional both. For example, the proved qualified object is the mountain, in case the probandum is 'being possessed of fire' on account of being possessed of smoke, because the mountain is experienced by direct perception. An optionally qualified object is the omniscient when his (of the omniscient) existence is the probandum, as in the inference that 'an omniscient exists because there are no definite proofs to prove the contrary in the inference: or just as the horn of the donkey, when its non-existence is the probandum in the inference, 'the horns of the donkey do not exist'. Here, the omniscient and the horns of the donkey are optionally proved before the proof of their existence or non-existence. In the inference 'the word is changeable, because it is produced',the word is a

qualified object, proved both ways. That word in the present is perceived directly but its knowledge in the past and the future is optional and since that all (the word of the present, past and future) is the qualified object,it is proved as well as optional. Anything can be probandum in a qualified object which is proved or is both proved and optional but in an optionally qualified object it is a rule that only the existence or the non-existence is the probandum, as it is said **"in that when it is optional the existence and its opposite are the probandum"** (Pari. 3. 23).

*43. Here the Buddhists say that existence cannot be the probandum in the qualified subject which is optional because it is not consistent to prove its particular existence, as existence in general is undesirable; it is wrong; if this be so, there would be an occasion for elimination of all inference, as when fire in general is undesirable, it will not be consistent with a particular fire. Now, when the existence is the probandum, its cause would either be a positive quality or a negative quality or a quality which is both positive and negative; in the first case it cannot be proved because a positive quality cannot be established in an object whose existence is not proved. In the second case, there would be an over-lapping because that characteristic would be present even where existence is absent. In the third case, there would be a contradiction because a negative quality cannot be there in an object which exists, as it is said, **"there is no positive quality in a thing which is not true, because then there will be over-lapping both ways, and a non-existent thing is contradictory of any quality so how can that existence be proved ?"(Pramāṇavārtika, 1.192)**; if this be said; no; in this way there would be no inference of the fire by the smoke because of the optional quality of being possessed of the fire.

*44. The Naiyāyikas say that there is no qualified object which is optionally proved, because an optional thing cannot be valid. If this be accepted, this very reasoning cannot be held good and he (the Naiyāyika) should remain silent because a qualified object which is optionally proved is itself not proved, and there cannot be any logical negation of it.

*45. This should be borne in mind—the qualified object which is proved optionally is not experienced in toto, because then there would be a knowledge of a non-existent thing. And, if we accept its knowledge qualified by the words etc. then in case of doubt or certainty of absence of the epithet, there would be no knowledge of the qualification and then the inference of the optional only in the form of imposition of the necessary concomitance, will have to be accepted in the part of the epithet, because the only purpose of this is to negate the contrary imposition assumed by the opponent by proving the existence, characterised by the existence in a particular territory and time and by proving the non-existence, characterised by the absence of the existence in all territories and times.

*46. In fact, it is proper to prove the existence or non-existence, in part, of the well-known object. It is because of this that while commenting on **"there is no negation of the non-existence"** (Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 1574) the sentence—'there is no donkey-horn'—has been interpreted as "there is no horn in the donkey." In the inference of the particulars that 'an object, which is absolutely eternal, is not capabale of performing any action, because there is no simultaneity or order', it is easy to prove the absence of the power to perform any action in the absence of order and simultaneity, in things which are eternal : this should be thoroughly examined by those who have a knowledge of the doctrines of their own as well as of others.

[*18. The Discussion of Inference for Others*]

*47. By transference of epithet, an inference for others, consisting of the statement of the cause and the subject, is called inference, because it gives the knowledge of the object through inference to the listener. The Buddhists say that the subject is known by the discussion itself and, therefore, should not be expressively said; it is not so; being obstructed by certain statements, even though those who are more intelligent can know the subject, yet it should be indicated necessarily to others, and because only that subject is not to be expressed which is known by being one with the other sentences of the syllogism in question. And even the Buddhists must accept the statement of the subject necessary, like the concluding

statement, to indicate that the quality is a qualification of a certain qualified object; otherwise, there would be an occasion for not stating even the cause which can be known only by the statement of the support, and as far as the condition of making known to the people of dull wit is concerned, it is the same in both the cases. Moreover, if the statement was not to be stated, it should not have been stated even in the beginning of the scriptures, whereas this is found stated even in the Buddhist scriptures, and if this is said to be stated in the scriptures for favouring others, its use would be equally justified in a debate for those who want victory, for making it known to the person of dull wit.

*48. It is said that only that where a statement is given from the scriptures of the opponent to prove a thing, is the inference for others e. g. the inference of the Sāṅkhya that 'the intelligence is unconscious because it is created like the pitcher'. In this inference of the Sāṅkhya, the quality of being produced is not accepted by the Sāṅkhyas themselves, in the intelligence, so only here, it is a case of inference for others; this is not correct; because there is a difference of opinion regarding the validity of the scriptures between the two opponents, otherwise, the probandum would be proved by that (scripture) alone. And even if we accept the scripture before examining it, it would be obstructed at the time of examination. If it is so, how you yourself state this to others "which is absolutely one, cannot be connected with many as generality" ? True; but here we do not use it as a deciding factor of the object but rather as a means to establish that where one quality is there, another quality will also have to be accepted, because the deciding factor is the original cause which perverts this inference (namely, generality is multiformed because it is connected with many and that which is connected with many is multiformed), and because it is justifiable to use this inference as an aid to the original cause as by the removal of that which is coexistent with manifoldness, it (manifoldness)is also removed. And as regards the inference that 'the intelligence is unconscious etc.' it is not justifiable to use it, because we do not place any proof which obstructs the opponent

view and which imposes the opponent qualities and which proves the concomitance of the cause of the perversion of the inference.

*49. The cause should be used in two ways : as concomitant with the probandum and as being one impossible without the other e. g. the mountain consists of fire because the smoke can be there only when there is fire or because the smoke cannot be there if fire is not there. Since the probandum can be proved by the use of either of these two, the two are not used simultaneously.

*50. Only two—the statement of the thesis and the cause —are the parts of inference for others and not the statement of illustration etc. because the other can understand by the use of the thesis and the cause alone and the relationship of concomitance is decided by reasoning alone, and that concomitance is reminded by the statement of the thesis and the cause alone and because an illustration which is uncorroborated cannot lead to knowledge, and if the illustration is corroborated, it becomes a case of one which is already proved otherwise. Corroboration means proving the concomitance of the cause with its probandum, having proved it free from the fallacy of unproven etc. and if the other men can understand by this alone what is the use of making any other effort ?

*51. The use of the illustration etc. is justified to make the dull-witted persons understand; thus one who is definite about the thesis by the destruction-cum-subsidence (of the veil)and is capable of understanding the other parts being expert in remebering the reasoning, which leads to concomitance and which is reminded of by the illustration, to such a person the cause alone should be stated. To one who is not definite about the thesis as yet, the thesis should also be stated, and the illustration should also be stated to one who does not remember the reasoning leading to the remembrance of concomitance. Even the application should be stated for a person who does not know how to apply the cause in the thesis and the conclusion should be stated to one whose curiosity is still unfulfilled. The puri-

fication of the thesis etc. should be stated to a man who does not agree with regard to the nature of the thesis etc. and thus, the cause can have even ten parts.

[19. Treatment of the Varieties of Cause]

*52. This cause is two-fold: positive and negative. The positive is also two-fold: that which proves something positive and that which proves something negative. The former of these is of six types, to elaborate—some cause is determinate concomitant only e.g. the word is non-eternal because it is created by effort. Though all causes are determinate concomitant, yet here this variety has been separately accepted as being different from the rest of the varieties as cause viz. effect etc. Thus, the inference that 'this is tree because it is śiṁśapā' (Dalbergia sissoo) will also be included in it. Some causes are effect e.g., this mountain consists of fire because, otherwise the fact of containing smoke cannot be justified. Here smoke which is the effect of the fire and cannot be justified in its absence, makes the fire known. Some causes are in the form of cause (as against the effect) e. g., there would be rain because otherwise a particular type of cloud could not have been there; here that particular cloud being the cause of the rain makes the rain, which is its effect, known. Certainly, if it is said that the cause is possible even without its effect and is, therefore, not an indicator of the effect and, therefore, the fire does not indicate the smoke; it is true; but where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also co-operating and there is no hindrance in its capability, there alone the cause can also be the indicator of the effect. Some cause precedes e. g., śakaṭa would rise because otherwise the rise of kṛttikā would not have been there. Here, after the rise of the kṛttikā the rise of the śakaṭa takes place immediately after it without exception and, therefore, the kṛttik indicates the rise of the śakaṭa as its predecessor cause. Some cause is the successor e. g., Bharaṇi rose before, because kṛttikā is rising. Here, the rise of the kṛttikā, which succeeds the rise of the Bharaṇī, indicates it. These two (the predecessor and the successor) are different from the cause and the effect

as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. Some cause is simultaneous e. g., the fruit of bijorā(a species of citron)should be possessed of form because the fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the form, being not justifiable in its absence, indicates it. It differs from the nature, cause and effect because it is different in its nature and has no priority and successiveness. In these examples, the positive cause like smoke etc. prove the positive thing like fire etc., therefore, they are positive proving a positive thing, and they are also known as availability of non-contradictory.

*53. The second is that which proves negation and which is called the availability of the contradictory. It is of seven types: contradiction in nature and availability of concomitant with that etc. e.g., there is no absolute absolutism because non-absolutism is found. He has no certainty of the reality because there is doubt. He has no pacification of anger because there are signs of agitation on his face etc. He cannot tell a lie because he is possessed of a knowledge which is not polluted by attachment etc. The Puṣya constellation will not rise because Rohiṇī has arisen. The Mṛgaśīrṣa did not arise a moment before because Pūrva-phālgunī has arisen. He has no false knowledge because he has right attitude. Here non-absolutism is contradictory in nature to absolutism which is to be negatived. The doubt in the reality is concomitant with uncertainty which is contradictory to certainty of the truth which is to be negatived. The signs of agitation etc. on the face constitute the effect of non-pacification which is contradictory to the pacification of the anger. Possession of a knowledge not polluted by attachment etc. is the cause of truthfulness which is contradictory to a lie. The rise of Rohiṇī is predecessor of the rise of the Mṛgaśīrṣa which is contradictory to the rise of Puṣya tārā. The rise of Pūrvaphālgunī is a follower of the rise of Maghā which is contradictory to the rise of Mṛgaśīrṣa. Right faith is the concomitant of right knowledge which is contradictory to false knowledge.

*54. The negative cause is also twofold: that which proves something positive and that which proves something

negative. The first is called non-availability of the contradictory and is of five types: non-availability of the effect contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the cause contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the nature contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the determinant concomitant contradictory to the probandum and non-availability of a concomitant contradictory to the probandum. For example, this man is extremely sick because we do not find the activities of a man free from sickness. Here is trouble because the desired object is not available. The objects are multisided because the nature of onesidedness is not found. Here is shade because heat is not available. Here is false knowledge because right attitude is not available.

*55. The second is the non-availability of the non-contradictory which is of seven types : non-availability of the nature, non-availability of the determinant concomitant, non-availability of the effect, non-availability of the cause, non-availability of the predecessor, non-availability of the follower, non-availability of one which is simultaneous. For example, 'here is no pitcher on the earth because there is no availability of its nature which is due if it were available'. There is no panasa (Artocarpus integrifolia) because there is no tree available. This seed is not with its power unobstructed, because a sprout is not seen in it. He has no peacefulness etc. because there is no faith in the true nature of things. Svāti will not arise after a moment because the rise of citrā is not seen. Pūrvabhādrapada did not rise a moment before because we have no knowledge of the rise of Uttara-bhādrapada. He has no right knowledge because we do not find any right attitude. Thus, though of many types, the cause is characterised by the only quality of not being coherent otherwise, and other than that are fallacies.

[20. Description of fallacies.]

*56. This fallacy is three-fold: unproved, contradictory and inconclusive. That whose nature is not determined is unproved. Indetermination of knowledge is either through ignorance or through doubt or through perversion. It is two

fold: unproved for both and unproved for either of the two. As an example of the former we can say 'the word is changeable, because it can be perceived by the eyes.' As an example of the latter, we can say 'the trees are unconscious because they are devoid of knowledge, senses and death in the form of stoppage of age', or 'happiness etc. are unconscious because they are created'.

*57. If it is said that there is no fallacy unproved for both, because when once one says that it is unproved and if the opponent does not state a proof to prove it, then it will be unproved for both, because of the absence of any proof, and if he states a proof, then, because of the proof being impartial, it will prove it for both. Moreover, as long as he cannot produce a proof for the other to prove it, it is unproved to him also; it this be argued, then this is secondarily unproved because the jewel etc. are not primarily called false jewels as long as they do not appear to be so. Moreover, if the fallacy is unproved for one of the debator, the opponent would be defeated and if he is defeated, it is difficult to free him from defeat. Nor it is proper to support it afterwards by cause, because the debate lasts only as long as there is defeat. Here, it is to be said that just as a debator even though accepting the propriety of the cause, cannot make the other debator or those who ask question, understand it, because of their forgetfulness etc. of the logic given for its support, similarly, he does not accept the unproved also and is defeated by the cause which is unproved for both. Moreover, even if not accepting it himself, if a cause is placed, because it is proved for the opponent, it is the unproved for one of the two and a place for defeat, e. g., the following arguments of the sāṁkhya towards the Jainas: 'happiness etc. are unconscious because they are created like pitcher etc.'

*58. That which is concomitant with the contrary to the probandum is called the contradictory cause e. g., the word is not changeable because it is produced. Here the quality of being a product is concomitant with changeability, which is contradictory to unchangeability.

*59. That whose consistency otherwise is doubted is

inconclusive. It is of two types: that whose existence in the heterologous is decisive and that whose existence in the heterologous is doubtful. The example of the former is 'the word is eternal because it is knowable, Here the quality of knowablity etc. is decided in the example of sky and is similarly decided in the heterologous example of the non-eternal pitcher etc. The example of the latter is that the person under discussion is not an omniscient, because he is a speaker. Here this quality of being a speaker is doubtful in the omniscient, because it is doubtful whether the omniscient is a speaker or not. Similarly, the example that the son of Mitra is black, should also be given.

*60. A fourth type of fallacious cause, given by Dharmabhūṣaṇa, "immaterial" by name, should not be accepted. This immaterial or purposeless is of two types—the means to prove that which is already proved and that which is obstructed; but these two are not different from the varieties of the appearance of the known thesis and the appearance of the thesis which has been refuted. It should not be said that where there is a fallacy in the thesis, there should be fallacy in the cause also, because then we will have to accept the fallacy of the examples etc. also. By this, mis-timed should also be taken to be refuted. Similarly, inconclusive is also not additional which is there where there are two causes of equal force and of opposite nature and this is included in the unproved fallacy, because the logical impossibility of one without the other—the cause and the probandum under discussion—is not decided.

[21. Investigation of the Organ of Knowledge, viz: Scriptures.]

*61. Scripture is that knowledge which is manifested in the statement of some authentic personalities. It cannot be said that it is included in the inference because like smoke it also supports the truth by the force of the cognition of the invariable concomitance, because a man who is habituated can know the truth (by it) without depending on the cognition of the concomitance, just like a man, who is expert in knowing the real or false coin, distinguishes between the two as though by perception. One, who is expert in advising beneficial things, preceded by the knowledge of the

real state of affairs, is authentic. His statements consist of letters, words and sentences. The letters etc. are the alphabets which are material. One, which has a particular meaning, is word and a collection of the words, which are inter-related with each other, forms a sentence.

*62. This organ of knowledge of scriptures, states its meaning always positively as well as negatively and follows the seven-fold way of statement, because it can be valid and real in that very way, giving us the full truth and because even when only one way of stating a thing is used, the other ways of stating the truth are always supplied by those who have intelligent understanding. In sentences like 'there is a pitcher', there is no seven-fold statement, and it is considered valid from worldly point of view, only because it can convey the sense, but, in reality, it should be noted that it is not valid.

[22. Discussion about the Seven-fold Statement]

*63. If it is asked : what is this seven-fold statement; the answer is : keeping in view the enquiries regarding each and every aspect of an object, the statement in seven ways, which is not self-contradictory and is marked by syāt (from one point of view) and states negatively and positively, separately, and both ways, collectively, is the seven-fold statement. This seven-fold statement arises in accordance with the seven types of questions, arising out of seven types of curiosities, arising out of seven types of doubts; there being seven types of qualities possible with reference to each mode of an object. The first statement, amongst these, is that from a particular point of view every thing does exist, taking primarily the positive aspect. Here from a particular point of view, means relatively from the point of view of its own form, territory, time and nature. All pitchers etc. exist in their form of being made of clay and not of water etc.; from the point of view of territory, in Pāṭaliputra etc. and not in Kānyakubja etc.; from the point of view of time, in autumn etc. and not in spring etc.; and from the point of view of nature, as black and not as red. Similarly, the second statement is that anything, from a point of view, does not exist, taking primarily the negative aspects.

This non-existence is not imaginary because this is experienced independently like the existence, otherwise, the three-fold characters of the cause would be disturbed, because non-existence in the heterologous example would not be real. From a particular point of view it exists and from a particular point of view it does not exist—this is the third statement taking positive and negative aspects into account, respectively. The fourth is that from a particular point of view it is indescribable—where the negative and the positive aspect have been given predominance simultaneously, because both cannot be simultaneously expressed in one word, because even by the continuous participles like 'being' etc. the two meanings are shown one by one and because by such words as 'one of the two', even though somehow both of them may be known, yet each one of them cannot be expressed by one word even by the Lord creator. The fifth is : from one point of view it does exist and from another point of view it is indescribable —here the positive aspects and the positive and the negative aspects have been kept in view simultaneously. The sixth is that from one point of view it does not exist and from another point of view it is indescribable—here the negative aspect and the positive and the negative aspects have been kept in view simultaneously. The seventh is that from one point of view it does exist, from another point of view it does not exist, and from yet another point of view it is indescribable—here the positive aspect and the negative aspect (respectively) and the positive aspect and the negative aspect simultaneously, have been kept in view.

*64. This seven-fold statement is the full and the partial with reference to each statement. The statement is full which is made simultaneously about an object whose infinite aspects have been proved by an organ of knowledge, identifying by transference of epithet or by making the identical aspect pre-dominant by times etc. That statement is partial which states one by one about an object, which has been made the subject of one point of view by differentiating by transference of epithets or by making the aspects of difference dominant. What is this order and what is this simultaneity? We explain it—when the difference is desired to be expressed by means of times etc. of

the qualities of existence etc. then there is order, because one word cannot have the power of conveying many meanings. When those very aspects are spoken of as identical by means of times etc. and then by making one aspect expressed even by one word, the expression of the whole of the object becomes possible which assumes identity with it and this is simultaneity.

*65. What are these time etc.? We explain; they are time, form, object, relationship, effect, an aspect, an aspect of the object, contact and word. Now, when we say that from a particular point of view the objects soul etc. do exist, then we identify by time taking that all other infinite qualities in the object are there in the same time in which there is existence, And whatever is the innate nature of the existence of its own, similar is the innate nature of other infinite qualities of their own, and, therefore, they are identified with it on account of the fact of innate nature; and whatever object is the substratum, viz. the matter, of the existence that is also the substratum of other modes and, thus, there is identity with reference to the object. and whatever relationship of all pervasiveness is of existence, the same is the relationship of the others also, and, thus, there is identity from the point of view of relationship. And whatever effect has existence in sustaining object in its own form, similar is the effect of the other aspects, and, thus there is identity from the point of effect. And whatever is the place of the qualified object, viz. the territory of the existence, the same is that of other aspects, and, thus there is identity from the point of view of the territory of the qualified object. Ana whatever contact is of existence with the soul as being one with it, similar is that of other aspects and, thus, there is identity from the point of view of contact. In relationship, the difference is subordinate and the identity is predominant, whereas in contact, the order changes and this is the difference between the two. The word 'is', which is indicative of the quality of existence, is also indicative of all other infinite qualities, and, thus there is identity through word which is justified by giving a secondary place to the point of view of the mode and by giving predominance to the point of the matter. The identity

of the qualities is not possible, by subordinating the point of view of the matter and by predominating the point of the modes, because it is not possible for many qualities to be at one place simultaneously, or if at all it is possible, we would have to accept the difference of their substratum. And because there are the different qualities or, otherwise, there would be no difference in them and because the matter which is the substratum is also different, there would be a contradiction in its being the substratum of different qualities and because there is difference in the relationship on account of the difference of these which are related, because it is not consistent that many related things be related by one relation. The effect of each one of them, which is determined separately, is also different, because the effect of many effects cannot be one. The territory of one qualified object is different with reference to each quality, because if it is one there would be the inconsistency in identifying the territory of the qualified objects of the qualities of different objects. There is difference in the contact with reference to the contact, because if there is no difference in the contact to each, there would be no difference in those also which come in contact. There is difference in the word with reference to each subject, because if all qualities were to be indicated by a single word, then all objects of the world would be indicated by a single word; thus identity is secondarily imposed on qualities differentiated by times etc. Similarly, the attitude of difference and the secondary use of it should also be stated. Here ends the discussion of non-perceptible. And the object of organs of knowledge has been described by it.

Here ends the chapter on the organ of knowledge in the manual of Jaina logic, written by Paṇḍita Yaśovijayagaṇi, the brother of Paṇḍita Śrī Padmavijayagaṇi and the disciple of Paṇḍita Śrī Nayavijayagaṇi, the class-fellow of Paṇḍita Śrī Jītavijayagaṇi, the best amongst the disciples of Paṇḍita Śrī Lābhavijayagaṇi, the chief disciple of Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Kalyāṇavijayagaṇi

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2. On The Partial Point of View.

[1. Investigation into the Nature of the Partial Point of View.]

*1. The organs of knowledge have been described. Now we describe the partial point of view. The partial point of view is the effort of cognising a part of an object, possessed of infinite qualities, cognised by the organ of knowledge, but not over-looking the other parts of it. This is different from the organ of knowledge as cognising only a part of it. Just as one part of an ocean is neither ocean nor non-ocean, similarly, partial point of view is neither organ of knowledge nor non-organ of knowledge. They are of two types—of the modes and of the substance. That which cognises only the substance primarily, is that of substance, and that which cognises only the mode primarily, is that of modes. The substantial is of three types : the non-distinguished, the generic and the empirical. The modal is of four types: the straight-expressed, the verbal, the subtle and the such-like. Jinabhadragaṇikṣamāśramaṇa holds the straight-expressed to be a variety of substantial.

*2. The non-distinguished is the effort to grasp all the aspects whether general or particular e. g., the desire to make one subordinate and the other predominant out of the two substances and out of the mode and the substance, e.g., there is existence and consciousness in the self. Here out of two modes one is intended to be predominant and another is intended to be subordinate. Here consciousness which is the manifest mode, is the object qualified and as such, is predominant, whereas the existence is the epithet, and as such, is subordinate. That which is characterised by the capacity to do something positive or negative is called the manifest mode, and that which is the nature of the object, limited only to the present, and having no contact with the past and the future, is the mode of the object. In the example that 'the object is that which is characterised by the mode of the object', two objects have been intended to be indicated as predominant and subordinate, because here the qualified object viz., the

object consisting of modes is predominant and the object as an epithet is subordinate. In the example that 'a man devoted to passion is happy for a moment', the person devoted to passion as being an object, which is qualified, is primary, whereas the quality of happiness, as an epithet,is subordinate. It should not be said that the non-distinguished is an organ of knowledge as it deals with both the object and its mode, because only that, which deals with them both as predominant, is an organ of knowledge.

*3. That, which deals only with the general qualities, is the generic. It is of two types : ultimate and non-ultimate. The ultimate generic it that which takes into consideration only the pure existence of the substance, being indifferent to all particulars e. g. the universe is one because it has the common quality of existence. That which, though, accepting the general substance etc., adopts the attitude of closing of eye like an elephant in regard to its varieties, is known as non-ultimate generic. That, which distinguishes methodically in the objects, cognised by generic, is empirical e.g., that, which is existence, is either the matter or the mode. The matter is of six types—the soul etc. The mode is of two types—the simultaneous and that which comes in order.

*4. Analytic stand point is that which primarily indicates only that mode, which is of the present moment e.g., there is the mode of happiness at present. Here, the temporary mode of happiness is shown primarily. Its substratum, the soul, is not said as the subordinate.

*5. That, which accepts the difference in the meaning of the word on account of time etc., is known as verbal. Time etc. include time, case, gender, number, person and preposition, e. g., there was, is and will be Sumeru—here, it accepts the difference in the Sumeru from the difference of the time etc; 'the pitcher is made' and 'he makes the pitcher'—here (it accepts the difference) by the difference of the case; taṭa, taṭī and taṭam (coast)—here (it accepts difference) by the difference of the gender; dārāḥ and kalatram (wife)—here (it accepts difference) by the difference of number; thou goest and you go—here (it accepts difference) by the difference of

person; santiṣṭhate and avatiṣṭhate(he stands)—here it accepts (difference) by the difference of preposition.

*6. Subtle is that which accepts different meaning of the synonym words by the difference of their etymology. The verbal stand-point accepts identity in the object, even though there is difference in the modes. Subtle accepts difference of objects when the modes are different. It overlooks the identity of the meaning of the synonyms e. g. he, who has great power, is Indra; he, who is capable, is śakra; he, who pierces the city, is Purandara. etc.

*7. Such-like point of view is that which accepts the meaning of the words indicated by them only when the object is engaged in the action, indicated by those words. e. g. Indra is so (only) when he has great power. The subtle point of view accepts the use of Indra etc. for whether the action of having great power is present or not, because the word is used to indicate an object which is possessed of the action in general just as the word 'cow' is used for a particular animal, whether there is the action of going in it or not, because such is the convention. But such-like point of view accepts the word Indra etc. only when it is performing that action and is engaged in the action of having great power etc. From this point of view there is no word which is not the indicator of some action because the words indicating a class, like cow and horses etc., are also root-words e. g., a cow is that which goes and a horse is that which goes swiftly. Even the words indicating qualities like white and blue—are also root-word, white being that which purifies, and the word 'blue' meaning that which makes blue. The words, which are proper names like Devadatta and Yajñadatta, are also root-words meaning 'may god give it' or 'may the sacrifice give it'. The word indicating a union or a collection is also root-word because here also the action of the existence of the staff in the daṇḍī and of the horns in an animal possessed of horns, predominates. This point of view accepts that the five types of words are only from practical point of view and not in reality.

*8. Out of these the first four dealing primarily with the meaning are the points of view of the meaning whereas, the last

three dealing primarily with the words, are the points of view of words. Those points of view which cognise only the particular, are called implied points of view, whereas those who cognise the general are called unimplied. From the point of view of the unimplied view-point, all the Siddhas have the same nature. From the point of view of implied view-point, the Siddhas, who get liberation in one or two or three times, are equal to only those who get liberation in the same period. The empirical point of view is that which follows the famous conventional meaning e. g., even though there are five colours in the bee, yet the bee is called black. That point of view, which accepts the real nature of the things is real. It accepts that there are five colours in the bee because its body, which is gross, is made of material of five colours; but the other colours white etc, being subordinate, are not felt. Or we can say that one, which takes into consideration only one point of view, is empirical, whereas that which takes into consideration all points of view, is real. We should not say that in this way the real point of view would become an organ of knowledge and thus, its nature as a particular point of view would be disturbed, because it accepts the predominance of (only) that point of view which is under its jurisdiction, even though taking into consideration all point of views. Those points of view are called the points of view of knowledge, which accept predominance of knowledge only. Those points of view which accept only the predominance of the action, are called points of view of action. The four points of view, analytic etc., accept the predominance of action, characterised by conduct, because it is the immediate cause of liberation. Though the non-distinguished, the generic and the empirical accept all the three—conduct, knowledge and faith—as the cause of liberation, but separately and not collectively, because this point of view does not accept that liberation is necessarily effected by the three, knowledge etc. alone, otherwise, they would not be the points of view, because the acceptance of them collectively is the real doctrine.

*9. Which point of view again here covers much and which less? We state it—the non-distinguished covers more

than the generic, which covers only the existence, because, it (the non-distinguished) covers both existent and non-existent. The generic, as it shows all the existent object collectively, covers more than the empirical, which manifests only a particular existence. The empirical covers more, being related with the objects of all the three times—past, present and future—than the analytic which deals with only the objects of the present. The analytic covers more as it cognises the opposite ofthe verbal, which accepts different objects, differentiated by time etc. The verbal is less than the analytic not only by the difference of time, etc. but also because it accepts only one aspect of the existence of the existent pitcher also as-'it is pitcher from a particular point of view' and 'it is not pitcher from a particular point of view'; and, thus, it is more particularised than the analytic. Though, the object, possessed of seven aspects, is accepted only by one who accepts non-absolutism, yet there is no fault in accepting that it propounds a particularised object than accepted by the analytic verbal point of view. The verbal point of view coveres more than the subtle as it accepts the difference of meaning of synonym words and it does not accept the difference in the object on account of the difference of the synonym. The subtle covers more than the such-like which accepts the difference in the object on the basis of the difference in the action.

*10. A statement from a particular point of view is also affirmation with reference to its object, but it is only a partial statement and it should be observed that this is its difference from the statement of the organ of knowledge.

[2. Discussion of the False Points of View.]

*11. Now we deal with the false points of view. That which covers only object and overlooks the mode, is the false point of view of substance. That, which covers only the mode and overlooks the substance, is the false point of view of mode. That, which accepts absolute independence of the quality and the qualified object, is the false point of view of the non-distinguished e. g., the philosophy of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. That which accepts the non-duality of the exis-

tence and refutes all individuals is the false generic point of view e. g., all systems of non—dualism and the Sāṅkhya philosophy. That, which intends an unreal division of the substance and its mode, is the false empirical point of view e. g., the Cārvāka system. Cārvāka refutes the division of substance and the modes, etc. of the soul, supported by the organ of knowledge and supports, as a follower of the rough common usage, only the division of four matters. That which refutes the substance altogether and accepts the present mode only, is the false analytical view-point e. g., the philosophy of the Buddhists. That which accepts only the difference in the objects on the basis of difference of times etc., is the false verbal view-point e.g., the Sumeru 'was,' 'is' and 'will';(these words) indicate altogether a different meaning because they are words belonging to different times and are like the other words which are proved to be so. That which accepts only the difference of the objects indicated by the synonym words, is the false subtle view e. g., Indra, Śakra aud Purandra etc. indicate altogether different objects, because they are different words like other words as, 'elephant' and 'deer.' That which accepts that a word cannot indicate an object which is not possessed of the action, is the false such-like view-point e. g., a pitcher which is devoid of a particular action is not to be indicated by the word 'pitcher', because it is not possessed of the action, which is the cause of using that word, just like another word. That which indicates only the meaning and negates the word, is the false point of view of meaning. That which indicates the word only and negates the meaning, is the false point of view of word. That which indicates the implied and refutes that which is not implied, is the false implied point of view. That which accepts that which is not implied and refutes that which is implied, is the false unimplied point of view. Negating the reality and accepting only the common place thing, is the false empirical point of view. Accepting the reality and negating the practical point of view, is the false real point of view. Accepting knowledge and refuting action, is the false point of view of knowledge. Accepting the action and refuting the knowledge, is the false point of view of action.

Here ends the chapter on the partial point of view in the manual of Jaina logic, written by Paṇḍita Yaśovijayagaṇi, the brother of Paṇḍita Srī Padmavijayagaṇi and disciple of Paṇḍita Śrī Nayavijayagaṇi, the class-fellow of Paṇḍita Śrī Jītavijayagaṇi, the best amongst the disciples of Paṇḍita Śrī Lābhavijayagaṇi, the chief disciple of Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Kalyāṇavijayagaṇi

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3. On the Symbol

[*The Discussion of the Symbols of name etc.*]

*1. The points of view have been discussed. Now, we discuss the symbol. Symbol is that which is particular type of composition of words or objects for proper adjustment and removal of the lack of understanding, in accordance with the context etc. The symbols are useful because they adjust the benediction of name etc. in the auspicious objects etc. as is said : "**symbol is fruitful because it removes the irrelevant and adjusts the relevant.** (Laghi. Svavi. 7.2") Generally speaking, they are of four types—name, replacement, substance and nature.

*2. The symbol of name is that which indicates the object not caring for the relevant meaning of the word e. g., the words like Indra etc., which indicate some child of a cow-man, are not indicated by the synonym words Śakra etc., and the words which are evolved accidentally and are not used in any other sense like Ḍittha and Ḍavittha. This indentity of the name and its object is in reality dependent on the meaning, but, secondarily it is dependent on the words. From the point of view of the Meru etc., the symbols of name last as long as the objects, whereas in case of the names 'Devadatta' etc. they do not last as long as the object, or the

script 'Indra' etc, which are names of a particular object, inscribed on a book, paper or picture etc., is also the symbol of name.

*3. The object, which is devoid of the essence of that object but is replaced with that intention, is called replacement; it is of the same type in the picture but is formless in the dice etc; it lasts for a short period in picture etc. but lasts as long as the object in the image of the naturāl temples; just as the image of Jina is the symbol of Jina and just as the image of Indra is the symbol of Indra.

*4. That which is the cause of the past or the future, is the symbol of substance, as the use of the word Indra for one who has once experienced the state of Indra or will experience the state of Indra in future; here, the use of the word Indra being justified like the use of the word 'pitcher of ghee' with reference to one, which has once been the substratum of the ghee or would be the substratum of ghee in future. Sometimes, the symbol of substance is used to indicate the sense of secondary, just as one who crushes the charcoal is called the nominal ācārya, i. e. he is an ācārya, because he is not possessed of the qualities of the ācārya. Sometime, it is used in the sense, in which it is not in actual use e. g., the worship of Jina even though done with devotion yet done unmethodically and characterised by the desire for this world and the other world and not free from the desire, is called the pseudo-action because the improper action is not the way to liberation directly. It is called 'material' because done with devotion even though unmethodically, it is the way to liberation indirectly because the ācāryas proclaim that the quality of devotion renders, the fault of being unmethodical, powerless.

*5. That which is symbolised as itself characterised by experience of the action which one desires to convey, is called actual symbol e. g., one who is engaged in the action of having great power, is actual Indra.

*6. What is the difference between the names etc. excepting the actual, because all (the three) are found in all the

three ? The name, for example, is common in every object, which is named, and in its image and in the substance. The absence of the real object, in the form of image, is also found equally in all the three, because all the three are devoid of the real. The substance also exists in the name, the image and the substance, because it is the substance which is named and of which the image is made, and, of course, the substance in the substance itself is present by its very nature; therefore, it is not proper to distinguish between these as there are no contradictory qualities in them; if this be said; no, their difference is justified, because even though they are not possessed of contradictory qualities in this way, yet in another way, contradictory qualities can be proved in them; e. g. the image is different from the name and the substance, because there we have the form, intention, conception, action and the resultant e. g., in the image of Indra, the form as being possessed of thousand eyes etc. and the intention of that person, who made the image, as to make it real Indra and the conception of Indra, of one who sees it, by looking at that form, and the action of bowing etc. of those, whose minds are engaged in devotion, and the resultant in the form of the birth of son etc., is also seen. These things are not so in the name 'Indra' and the potential Indra, and, therefore, it is different from these two. Similarly, the substance being the potential cause of the real is also different from the name and the image, e. g., a speaker, without attention, is a potential one, as at the time of attention, he becomes the cause of the real, characterised by attention, or just as the soul of a monk is potential Indra, as it is the cause of the real Indra. This is not the case with the name and the image of Indra. Similarly, the name is also different on account of the above said differences from the image and the substance. Therefore, even though the milk and the butter-milk etc. are identical from the point of view of whiteness yet, they are different from the point of view of sweetness etc. Similarly, the name etc., though identical from one point of view, are different from another point of view.

*7. One can say that only the real is the object; what is

the use of accepting name etc. which are devoid of the substance; it is not so; even the name etc. are the characteristics of the object and, therefore, in general, they also are not excluded from the real. When one says 'Indra', without any qualification, the qualified thing is known only by context etc. by thinking over all the four—the names etc. Or these names etc. are used as the part of the real itself, because the emotions are aroused even at the name of Jina or the image of Jina or at the sight of the body of a dead sage. Of course, the three—the names etc. alone are not the immediate and the unfailing cause of exciting the emotion and therefore, the old ācāryas accept the superiority of the real which is the immediate and the unfailing cause. This has been said from the point of view of the names of different objects. The names etc., which are in the same object, are the object because they invariably accompany the real, because every object is a name itself in the form of the word, the image in itself in its form, a substance in its cause, and it assumes the reality when it becomes the effect. If the name of the pitcher were not the characteristic of the pitcher, then it would not be an indicator of it; because it is the cause of relation of identity with one which is not different from itself and, therefore, everything is in the form of the name. And, everything has a form because all—the intelligence, words, pitcher etc.—have a form of their own, and the form of the blue etc. and of particular postures etc. are proved by experience. Everything is substantial because everywhere the substance is experienced as the cause of the manifestation and the concealment and as free from all modifications like the snake which is sometimes with raised hood, sometimes without hood and sometimes circular. Everything is real, because it is experienced as being the cause and effect in the form of modification. Therefore, the world is made of these four and thus we have a combination of the points of view of names etc.

[2. The Adjustment of the Symbols in the Points of View]

*8. Now we adjust the points of view with the symbols of names etc. The three, names etc. are accepted by the

material point of view only, whereas the real is experienced by the point of view of the mode only. The first has two varieties—the generic and the empirical, because the non-distinguished which cognises the general is included in the generic and the non-distinguished which cognises the particular is included in the empirical point of view. The four—the analytic etc.—are the varieties of the second. This has been said in accordance with ācārya Siddhasena by the reverend Jinabhadra Gaṇi kṣamā śramaṇa in the Viśeṣāvaśyaka : **names etc. belong to the substantial and the real to the modal point of view. The generic and the empirical are the varieties of the first and the rest of the second** (75).

He expresses his own point of view at the time of discussing the symbol of salutation etc : **the verbal point accepts all the symbols** [2847], By this statement, he means to say that all the three verbal points of view accept only the real, as being pure, and the other four—analytic etc.—accept all the four symbols because of impurity. Some others hold that the analytic point of view accepts the name-symbol and the real only; this is not so; because the Sūtra scriptures declare that the substantial symbol is accepted by the analytic point of view, but it negates the acceptance of difference. Thus, the sūtra says : **'from the analytic point of view a person, who is not engaged in its conscious activity, is essentially one object, because this point of view does not accept the difference'** [Anuyoga sūtra, 14] And how will it not accept the image symbol, which has the shape of Indra and by looking at whom, the word 'Indra is uttered; while it accepts even the gold, which has not assumed any shape, in the from of a lump, as being the cause of the real modes of would-be necklace etc. ? The name, of course, is not illogical with reference to the visible. Moreover, why shall it not accept the name and the image symbols, which are not different from the cause of the real, while it accepts only the word 'Indra' etc. or only that which is indicated by the word 'Indra' etc. even when there is no reality ? Their acceptance would rather be more justifiable; because of the reason that the substance in the form

of the image of Indra and the image-symbol in the form of a particular shape, have the relationship of identity with the real, the mode of Indra, and as such are more closely related with it in comparison to the name which is related (only) through the relationship of the indicated and the indicator. Some say that the generic and the empirical accept three symbols except the image; this view is not free from faults, because it must be accepted that either the generic or the non-generic or the non-distinguished in general, accept the image, because the acceptance of the image is not prohibited in (other) substantial point of view except in the generic and the empirical. (Now which of the above mentioned three types of the non-distinguished accepts the image ?). In the first case, the generic (also) will have to accept the image, because the generic point of view is not different from the generic non-distinguished. In the case of the second (alternative), the empirical will have to accept that (i. e. the image) because that (i. e. the non-generic) is not different from the empirical point of view. And in the case of the third (alternative), even if accepting that the generic and the empirical separately do not accept the image; it would be difficult to avoid its acceptance jointly by them in the form of the full non-distinguished point of view, because each one of them (the generic and the empirical) cognise one part each of the undivided non-distinguished. Moreover, because the generic and the empirical are included in the non-distinguished, therefore, its attitude should also be included in them, because though the scope, characterised as the characteristic of both of them (viz. the general and the particular) cannot be included in one of them, yet the characteristic of one, viz. the image-symbol, can be easily held to be included, because the division of the generic and the empirical can be justified merely by accepting the general and the particular image-symbol—all this should be thought over in accordance with the scriptures. The objects, soul etc., should be symbolised by the symbols of names etc.

[3. The Symbols with reference to soul].

*9. That which, whether a soul or not, is named as soul,

is called the name-symbol of soul; the image-symbol of soul is the image of gods etc.; the real symbol of soul is one who is possessed of the subsidence of the knowledge-veiling karman. Thus, these three symbols are possible with reference to soul but not the substantial symbol. This would be possible, only if one who is not soul at present would become a soul in future, just as one who is not god in the present is to become god in future and that is called substantial symbol of god. But this cannot be accepted in the doctrine because the existence of knowledge in a soul is considered to be without beginning and without end. But if we were to imagine a soul, to be devoid of qualities and modes but possessed of a beginning-less knowledge, then this would be a non-existent thing, because the qualities and the modes of an existent thing cannot be eliminated by mental thinking. The objects do not show modifications depending on our knowledge but our knowledge is produced as the objects show modification. We cannot say the four-fold division of names etc. is disturbed by it, because it is possible in almost all other objects. "There is no disturbance in the rule if it is not possible in one", say the ancient people. Some say that one who knows the meaning of the word 'soul' but is not devoted to it, is also a substantial soul. Others say that I myself, the soul of the man, should be known [as the substantial soul] because I will be the cause of the soul of the god who is yet to take birth, and because I myself will transform myself in the form of the god. Therefore I am now the substantial soul. Their intention is this that the prior soul is the substance of that which is yet to take birth and to follow. In this way, only a liberated soul would be a real soul and no other soul—therefore, this point of view is also not free from defects; this is elaborated by the commentator of the *Tattvārtha*[1]

*10. This should be kept in mind that in thisway thought all mundane souls would be substantial but they would not the contradictory to real because it is held that the names etc. of one object are invariably concomitant with the real. So

1. Cf. Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti, p. 48.

"Or the name of the object is the name, its form is its image, its being cause to the coming mode is the substance and the object in its effective form is the real". (Viśeṣ vaṣyaka, 60).

If we accept so, it would not be possible to accept any substantial soul from the point of view of soul in general, because the man etc. are the particular soul of god etc.— all this has been discussed by us in detail in the *Nayarahasya* etc.

Here ends the chapter on the symbol in th manual of Jaina logic, written by Paṇḍita Yaśovijayagaṇi, the brother of Paṇḍita Śrī Padmavijayagaṇi and the disciple of Paṇḍita Śrī Nayavijayagaṇi, the class-fellow of Paṇḍita Śrī Jītavijayagaṇi, the best amongst the disciples of Paṇḍita Śrī Lābhavijayagaṇi, the chief disciple of Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Kalyāṇavijayagaṇi

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May this work, composed by the purity of faith, engendered by the unequalled favour of his service, when he, a noble teacher and scholar, Śrī Vijayādisiṁha, who was like the sun in the sky of the spiritual lineage of the noble teacher and scholar, Śrī Vijayādideva, has attained the throne of Indra, cause happiness and recreation amongst the groups of the learned. (1)

He, the most expert in the science of logic, who had received lore from Jītavijaya of lofty ideas as well as from the modest, learned teacher Nayādivijaya, and who had the wise Padmavijaya as his loving brother—has composed this treatise on Jaina logic. May it render pleasure to the reader.

Whatever merit I may have earned by composing this epitome of logic, may I attain the great wealth of the highest happiness thereby. (3)

On whom previously, the scholars in Kāśī had conferred the title of 'expert in logic' and who, when he had composed a hundred works, was awarded the degree of the 'ācārya of logic'; he, Yaśovijaya, an infant -pupil of the learned Nayādivijaya, has related this knowledge at the request of the disciples. (4)